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The Corporate Criminal: Why 
Corporations Must Be Abolished by Steve 
Tombs and David Whyte1
JOAN BROCKMAN2
STEVE TOMBS AND DAVID WHYTE provide an excellent indictment of the harms 
caused by corporate crime and call for the abolition of corporations. I will focus 
on three aspects of their argument: (1) Corporations are “a gross manipulation 
of the free market;”3 (2) the state is “bystander, facilitator and even conspirator 
in corporate crime;”4 and (3) borrowing from Frank Pearce (to whom the book 
is dedicated), corporations are a “form of structural irresponsibility.”5 This review 
then turns to some of the solutions proposed by the authors. 
Corporations, governments, and the media often describe the corporation 
as the best means of distributing goods and services, and balancing economic 
progress with the demands of social welfare. However, proliferating oligopolies 
in all areas of production and distribution illustrate that corporations are “a 
gross manipulation of the free market.”6 According to the authors, mergers assist 
corporations in raising prices; if there are any efficiencies, they are not passed 
on to consumers. Claims of efficiency also ignore the fact that corporations are, 
1. (Oxford: Routledge, 2015).
2. Professor, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University.
3. Tombs & White, supra note 1 at 12.
4. Ibid at 54.
5. Ibid at 114, citing Frank Pearce, “Corporate Rationality as Corporate Crime” (1993) 40 
Stud Pol Econ 135.
6. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 12.
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borrowing from Joel Bakan’s The Corporation,7 externalizing machines. According 
to Tombs and Whyte, costs are inflicted upon workers and the public (through 
death and disease) or socialized (left behind for the taxpayers to clean up). We 
see evidence of this in Canada with the numerous abandoned mining and oil 
extraction sites left to contaminate the air, water, and surrounding land.8 Even 
when corporations are required to pre-pay for their environmental harms, 
governments are still left picking up the costs when such funds are insufficient. 
For example, during the 2009 downturn in the oil and gas business, the Alberta 
government topped up the Orphan Well Association’s9 fund by $30 million.10 
The fact that corporate pollution is usually conducted under regulatory permits 
supports Tombs and Whyte’s assertion that the state is an active participant in 
corporate harms.
The authors provide examples of corporate-state collusion and crime, going 
back to the East India Company’s use of torture, decapitation, and live burning 
of competitors to dominate international trade.11 In 1935, Brigadier General 
Smedley S. Butler estimated that the First World War created 21,000 new American 
millionaires and billionaires, and this was probably an under-representation, as 
7. Ibid at 15, citing Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power 
(New York: Free Press, 2004).
8. See, for example, the environmental damage caused by the Giant Mine near Yellowknife and 
the estimated $900 million clean-up cost which will be funded by the federal government; 
the estimated cost of cleaning up all of the abandoned mines is in the billions. See Staff, 
“16x9: Taxpayers will foot the bill for cleaning up contaminated sites” (22 November 2014), 
online: Global News <globalnews.ca/news/1687225/16x9-taxpayers-will-foot-the-bill-
for-cleaning-up-contaminated-sites/>; Arn Keeling & John Sandlos, “The Toxic Legacies 
Project,” online: <www.abandonedminesnc.com/?page_id=470>. The Treasury Board of 
Canada lists federal contaminated sites and plans (or not) to clean them. See Government 
of Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Federal Contaminated Sites Inventory,” 
online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/fcsi-rscf/home-accueil-eng.aspx>.
9. “List of Orphan Wells” (2003), online: <http://www.orphanwell.ca/pg_orphan_well_list.
html>.The Orphan Well Association in Alberta is a delegated administrative organization 
that operates under the authority of the Alberta Energy Regulator to manage abandoned 
upstream oil and gas wells and pipelines in Alberta. As of 26 August 2015, it recorded a total 
of 695 orphan wells to be abandoned within the next six months and 503 reclamation sites. 
“Problem wells under long term care and custody are excluded” from these lists (ibid). The 
most expensive orphan expenditure was over $21 million.
10. Terry Reith & Briar Stewart, “Alberta faces growing backlog of abandoned oil 
and gas wells: Millions needed to clean up sites and mitigate environmental 
risk” (14 July 2015), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/
alberta-faces-growing-backlog-of-abandoned-oil-and-gas-wells-1.3150012>.
11. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 56.
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only those that accurately reported their income were counted.12 The Nazis could 
not have waged their aggressive war throughout Europe without the aid of US 
oil and gas companies; Swiss banks facilitated theft of property; General Motors 
manufactured German tanks; ITT ran Hitler’s telecommunication system, 
operated air craft factories for the Nazis, and provided bombs; and Standard 
Oil (now Exxon) joined with a Nazi firm (IG Farben) to carve up the oil and 
chemical market.13 More recent examples include ITT in Chile, providing 
money to destabilize the government and $1 million USD to the CIA to assist. 
Over 200 “western firms from 21 countries [were] implicated in the production 
of chemicals and missile parts sold to Iraq for illegal poison gas and nerve gas 
warfare.”14 According to Tombs and Whyte, some of these crimes lack public 
exposure, but others are so over-exposed that they are normalized. 
The state is also implicated in the laws it creates and how it does (or does 
not) enforce them. Sutherland introduced the concept of white-collar crime in 
the early 1940s to draw attention to the fact that corporate and other white-collar 
criminals are subject to differential enforcement through administrative 
segregation so that their crimes are treated as accidents and governed by 
administrative and regulatory actions, not the criminal law.15 When corporate 
criminals enter the criminal justice system, they are treated with leniency because 
judges and administrators are “either subject to the material ideological influence 
of business-people, or share their ideological and/or cultural world views.”16 The 
authors also highlight Karl Marx’s documentation of factory conditions in the 
1800s and the need for legislation to offer some protection for mutilated and 
short-lived children (the compliant labour force), on whom factory owners relied 
for their profits. 
The authors examine contemporary regulatory failures and dismiss 
three out of four models for understanding corporate regulation: consensus, 
12. Ibid at 55.
13. Ibid at 61.
14. Ibid at 63. For a discussion of the use of private security firms in foreign wars and commerce, 
see e.g. Lindsey Cameron & Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security 
Companies under Public international Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2I13); 
Scott Fitzsimmons, Private Security Companies in the Iraq War: Military Culture and the 
Use of Deadly Force (New York: Routledge, 2016); Scott Fitzsimmons, “Wheeled Warriors: 
Explaining Variations in the use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq” (2013) 
22:4 Sec Stud 707; Craig Forcese, “Deterring ‘Militarized Commerce’: The Prospect of 
Liability for ‘Privatized’ Human Rights Abuses” (1999-2000) 31:2 Ottawa L Rev 171.
15. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 132.
16. Ibid at 133, citing Edwin Sutherland, “Is ‘White-Collar Crime’ Crime?” (1944) 10:2 Am Soc 
Rev 132 at 137.
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neo-liberal, and captive theory. First, the consensus model of regulation (along 
with the compliance school of regulation and Braithwaite’s flexible pyramid of 
enforcement) is dismissed because there is little evidence to support the claim 
that self-regulation works. The consensus model downplays inherent conflicts in 
regulation, ignores worker and public protests, and allows corporations to bypass 
the rules by creative compliance and law avoidance. The second model, the 
neo-liberal understanding of government regulation, states that there is too much 
regulation and that we ought to leave regulation to market forces. Corporations 
will have to pay whatever the market bears and provide enough safety so that 
workers are prepared to engage in dangerous employment. According to Tombs 
and Whyte, the institutionalization of deregulation, the elimination of red tape, 
and the removal of resources for worker safety and consumer protection fail to 
take into account the externalization of costs—that is, the costs of production 
in terms of lives, injuries, and pollution are all socialized. The workers and 
citizens pay with their health and their lives, the taxpayers pick up the costs, 
and corporations walk away with the profits. The third model, a spinoff from 
neo-liberalism, is the law and economics movement and its capture theory. 
According to this model, government regulators may start off as zealous, but 
they are later captured and manipulated by big business. The theory is useful in 
explaining how governments facilitate corporate crime, but fails, according to 
Tombs and Whyte, to explain why the government sometimes imposes stricter 
regulation that might harm corporate profits. 
None of the above models account for resistance and the various social forces 
at work when regulations are produced and enforced, or not enforced. A fourth 
perspective, which emerges from critical and neo-Marxist research, examines 
conflict (“dissensus”), not consensus in the development and enforcement of 
legislation. The authors look at the thirteen-year campaign that resulted in the 
UK Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act in 2008 during a time 
of de-regulation. Given that the Institute of Directors was successful in lobbying 
the government of the United Kingdom to protect managers from prosecution, 
it is easy to see why the lobbyists for the legislation were critical of it. It is more 
difficult to understand why Tombs and Whyte view it as a success. The authors 
cite Steven Bittle’s book, Still Dying for a Living: Corporate Criminal Liability 
After the Westray Mine Disaster,17 as another example of the dissensus that goes 
into legislation aimed at prohibiting corporate crime. At least in this Canadian 
example, the legislation allowed for the prosecution of managers. According 
to Tombs and Whyte, regulation is more about making sure the corporate 
17. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012).
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economy does not self-destruct (maintaining the existing social order) than 
about controlling corporate power. Therefore, regulation can never be a solution 
to corporate crime. Once regulations are in place, their enforcement is open to 
negotiation and neglect.
In agreement with Paddy Ireland,18 the authors assert that the driving force 
behind the modern corporation was not economic efficiency but demands 
for investment opportunities by the growing British bourgeois class who had 
accumulated enormous surplus wealth. Limited liability (initially referred to as 
“limited responsibility”19) shielded investors from any losses over and above their 
investment. Corporations created subsidiaries so they too could take advantage of 
limited liability. Corporations also benefitted from the requirement of mens rea to 
establish criminal liability, as most corporate crime was the result of indifference 
to safety, not intentional harm. Judges were often unable or unwilling to find 
a directing mind (a requirement of the “identification doctrine”) in order to 
convict a corporation. The introduction of strict liability and a regulatory regime 
further removed the corporation from the realm of “real” crime, and the harm it 
caused was socially constructed as accidents or mistakes.20
The separation of ownership (shareholders) from management results in 
shareholders blaming managers, and managers justifying their actions on the 
basis of what is good for the corporation (minimizing costs and making profits). 
Shares depersonalize ownership, and owners have less of a commitment to the 
company. As Berle and Means wrote in 1932, the shares “glide from hand to 
hand, irresponsible and impersonal.”21 Shareholders expect to participate in the 
profit of a corporation but feel no responsibility for the harms caused to make 
that profit. Frank Pearce called this a “form of structural irresponsibility”22—
shareholders come and go, simply interested in their investments. Corporations 
contract out their work and create subsidiaries which further isolate them from 
responsibility and liability. The authors provide the example of Union Carbide 
blaming its subsidiary Union Carbide India for the Bhopal disaster. And it was 
18. Paddy Ireland, “Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company share 
and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality” (1996) 
17:1 J Leg Hist 4.
19. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 140.
20. Ibid at 92.
21. Ibid at 112, citing Adolf A Berle, Jr & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932).
22. Ibid at 72, citing Frank Pearce, “Crime and Capitalist Business Organisations” in N Shover 
and JP Wright, eds, Crimes of Privilege: Readings in White Collar Crime (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 35 at 45-46.
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this very arrangement that allowed the subsidiary to “drive conditions at the 
Bhopal plant to an unacceptably dangerous level.”23 Accordingly, the corporate 
veil, a term used to describe the law that limits shareholder liability to the shares 
they have bought in the corporation, allows those who engage in evil to avoid 
the consequences.
The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)24 drive and the publicity 
surrounding the good corporate citizen blur the line between corporations 
and politics, presenting the notion that governments do not need to intervene. 
These images provide corporations with a platform for their opposition to, and 
sabotage of, any proposed legislation that might reign them in. According to 
Tombs and Whyte, the rhetoric of CSR empowers corporations to take over 
what were once public functions—education, transportation, health, and 
welfare—and allows corporations to build consumer allegiance to secure 
and extend profit-maximization. Corporations act in spaces within the law: 
under-enforcement, negotiated penalties, minimalistic law-abiding behaviour, 
and so on. Corporations also act in spaces between the law. They may follow 
the rules in their own country, but they may also, for example, export hazardous 
material and exploit workers in other countries. In this vein, one might ask why 
we allow the importation of goods that are manufactured under conditions that 
would be considered criminal in our country. In addition, the export of jobs to 
lower bidding economies is having an impact on the economic well-being of 
countries that facilitate such exportation.25
In their final chapter, Tombs and Whyte address the question, “What is to 
be done about the corporate criminal?” In contrast to abolition, the government 
solution is to reduce the “burden” on corporations. The authors provide an 
example from the 2010 election in the United Kingdom—all three parties were 
committed to reducing the cost of doing business and to entering the age of 
austerity. The private sector would lead the way to recovery. The poison was 
now the cure. Along with austerity budgets came further privatization of, and 
23. Tombs & Whyte, ibid at 115.
24. The Government of Canada defines CSR as “the voluntary activities undertaken by a 
company to operate in an economic, social and environmentally sustainable manner.” See 
Global Affairs Canada, “Corporate Social Responsibility” (1 December 2015), online: 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/
other-autre/csr-rse.aspx?lang=eng>.
25. Mexican car manufacturing workers are paid 10% of what Canadian workers are paid, 
draining jobs from Canada. See CBC News, News Release, “Carmakers say adios to Canada 
as Mexico shifts into higher gear” (15 June 2015), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/
carmakers-say-adios-to-canada-as-mexico-shifts-into-higher-gear-1.3108148>.
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cutbacks to, public services, as well as mass unemployment, wage reduction, 
workfare instead of welfare, and increasing inequality. According to Tombs and 
Whyte, the privatization of government assets and services in England coincided 
with re-regulation—often in the form of opaque contracts. The illusion is free 
enterprise. The reality is “a complex web of (re) regulation.”26 Deregulation fails 
to capture the fact that “corporate activity is always regulated by the state”27 
in a non-antagonistic relationship of interdependence. Although delegating 
public services to private corporations empowers corporations to cause further 
harm (supported and underwritten by the state), the authors believe that 
these state-supported harms create a risk to both the state and corporations. 
The evidence shows that the private sector cannot deliver public services more 
efficiently than public servants. Privatization provides tremendous opportunities 
for corporate fraud on the government. For example, G4S and Serco, two large 
private security firms, were fined for charging the government for electronically 
“tagging offenders who were either in prison or dead.”28
Tombs and Whyte believe that these incidents of corporate crime subsidized 
by the state (e.g., the 2008 bank bail-outs) result in increased corporate 
vulnerability and state exposure, which can in turn lead to public demand for 
change. On the transformative front (with the ultimate goal of abolishing the 
corporation), they provide a number of examples: Occupy Wall Street and other 
organizations’ call to end legal personhood for the corporation in the United 
States and the movement (i.e., Move to Amend) to remove corporations from 
constitutional protection.29
In terms of ‘non-reformist reforms’ that do not call for abolition, they suggest 
increased liability on those who own and direct corporations, and they return to 
Coffee’s30 1981 recommendation for equity fines (reiterated by Pearce in 199331) 
whereby corporations are required to issue new shares to victims, trade unions, or 
a state-controlled compensation fund. Tombs and Whyte report that a proposal 
for equity fines was debated and rejected in Scotland in 2010.32
As an example of success, Tombs and Whyte identify campaigns against 
shale oil fracking in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, such success has not 
26. Supra note 1 at 23.
27. Ibid at 26.
28. Ibid at 171.
29. Ibid at 174.
30. John C Coffee, Jr “‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’: An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment” (1981) 79 Mich L Rev 386 at 413-24.
31. Supra note 5 at 149.
32. Supra note 1 at 175.
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been imported into British Columbia. While I read this book in July 2015, the 
BC government met at a special session in Victoria to pass legislation that would 
bind the province to a twenty-five year liquid natural gas (LNG) contract with a 
consortium led by Petronas, a Malaysian company. The contract would require 
the BC government to compensate the consortium if future governments raised 
income tax rates or carbon tax on the industry, reduced natural gas tax credits, 
or changed laws regarding greenhouse emissions that financially harmed the 
industry.33 The harms caused by fracking to water, land, livestock, and people, as 
well as the reduction in the land’s availability for more sustainable uses, were not 
highly visible in the media. Neither was the scientific link between fracking for 
LNG and earthquakes. In fact, most of the students in my Summer 2015 seminar 
on Corporate Financial Crimes and Misconduct were unfamiliar with fracking.
Even though regulations can never “tame private capital,”34 Tombs and 
Whyte believe that the regulation of corporations is worth pursing because 
at times it successfully disrupts capital and benefits workers, consumers, and 
local residents. Regulation can also undermine the absolute power of managers 
to do as they please and can sometimes mitigate the unequal distribution of 
harm. Empowering organized labour, local communities, activist groups, and 
whistle-blowers can put limits on corporate power and alleviate corporate harm. 
What they appear to be saying is, effectively, if you do not like what is happening, 
then you will have to do something about it; you cannot rely on government to 
act without very loud and decisive direction by the public, organized workers, 
community groups, parents, students, environmental groups, whistle-blowers, 
and so on. The book is a call for action.
Although the authors do an excellent job of indicting the corporation, they 
fall short on where we go from here. Their claim that they are not providing 
a “blue print for a future utopia” or a “political manifesto”35 does not fit well 
with the expectation that those who start a revolution should provide an action 
plan. If limited liability (i.e., responsibility) is the essence of the problem and 
serves no useful purpose other than to shield those who enter the casino world of 
33. Jason Proctor, “B.C. Legislature debates law on 25-year LNG deal: 
Unprecedented agreement would give industry relief from LNG-targeted tax 
increases” (13 July 2015), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
british-columbia/b-c-legislature-debates-law-on-25-year-lng-deal-1.3147535>.
34. Tombs & Whyte, supra note 1 at 177.
35. Ibid at 179.
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the stock market, why not start with double liability,36 then triple liability, until 
limited responsibility is removed?37 Such liability could easily be imposed in the 
same manner as the often proposed, but rejected, equity fine. If, for example, the 
clean-up cost of an oil spill is $1 billion, the corporation would be required to 
issue $1 billion worth of shares to an entity such as an independent administrative 
agency. A $1 billion equity fine could be imposed in a similar manner—by 
payment in shares. In addition, a social reconstruction of limited liability that 
returns us to the concept of limited responsibility might also assist in redirecting 
the public’s attention to the essence of what is wrong with the corporation.
The Corporate Criminal is reminiscent of Frank Pearce’s 1993 article 
“Corporate Rationality as Corporate Crime.”38 The authors provide examples of 
devastating corporate crime and harm, followed by the role that law plays, the 
lack of enforcement, privileging investors with limited liability, out-of-control 
managers, a replication of Kreisberg’s ideal types of how the corporation operates, 
the role of the state, and sites for struggles to control the corporation. Pearce laid 
much of the groundwork for implicating the corporation. Others (e.g., Bakan,39 
Bittle,40 Glasbeek,41 Hutchinson,42 and Slapper and Tombs43) have done the same, 
with varying solutions. It is time to take the next step. I look forward to a sequel 
that provides a road map for how corporations can be abolished.
36. For a discussion of double liability in 19th century (where shareholders were liable for a 
share’s unpaid value plus the value of the share), see RCB Risk, “The Nineteenth-Century 
Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario” (1973) 23:3 UTLJ 270 at 295-97.
37. A number of writers have suggested a return to unlimited liability in various forms. See 
e.g. Paddy Ireland, “Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate 
Irresponsibility” (2010) 34:5 Cambridge J Econ 837. Indeed, unlimited liability corporations 
do exist. See e.g. Mohamed F. Khimji, “Shareholder Liability in Nova Scotia Unlimited 
Companies” (2014) 37:2 Dal LJ 787. In addition, some provinces allow lawyers and other 
professionals to incorporate unlimited liability corporations.
38. Supra note 5.
39. Supra note 7.
40. Supra note 17.
41. Harry Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth: Corporate Crime, Corporate Law, and the Perversion of 
Democracy (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002).
42. Allan C Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep: Corporate Governance for a Democratic Society 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005).
43. Gary Slapper & Steve Tombs, Corporate Crime (Essex, UK: Pearson Education, 1999).
